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The Sacrificial Yoo:   
Accounting for Torture in the OPR Report 
David D. Cole* 
Whatever else you might say about John Yoo, the former Justice 
Department lawyer who drafted several memos in 2002 authorizing the CIA 
to commit torture, you have to admit that he’s not in the least embarrassed 
by the condemnation of his peers.  The Justice Department on February 19, 
2010, released a set of previously confidential reports by its Office of 
Professional Responsibility (OPR) excoriating Yoo’s legal work – but 
stopped short of referring him for professional discipline.  Immediately 
thereafter, Yoo wrote op-eds for The Wall Street Journal and The 
Philadelphia Inquirer trumpeting his “victory.”  In The Wall Street Journal 
piece, titled “My Gift to the Obama Presidency,” Yoo argued that President 
Obama owes him a debt of gratitude for “winning a drawn-out fight to 
protect his powers as commander in chief to wage war and keep Americans 
safe.”1  Four days later, in The Philadelphia Inquirer, Yoo called the 
decision not to refer him for bar discipline “a victory for the people fighting 
the war on terror.”2 
This is a bit like a child coming home with an F on his report card and 
telling his parents that they should congratulate him for not getting 
suspended, or President Bill Clinton proclaiming to Hillary that Congress’s 
failure to impeach him was a vindication of his affair with Monica 
Lewinsky.  The one thing practically everyone interviewed by the OPR 
agreed about was that Yoo’s legal work on the torture memos was 
atrocious.  Bush’s Attorney General Michael Mukasey called it a “slovenly 
mistake.”3  Jack Goldsmith, another Republican who headed the Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC) from 2003 to 2004, said that Yoo’s August 2002 
memo justifying torture by the CIA was “riddled with error” and a “one-
sided effort to eliminate any hurdles posed by the torture law.”4  Daniel 
Levin, who headed the Office of Legal Counsel after Goldsmith left and 
who, like Yoo, was a former clerk to Justice Clarence Thomas, described 
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his reaction upon reading Yoo’s memo as “this is insane, who wrote this?”5 
Steven Bradbury, acting head of the OLC after Levin’s departure, also 
under President Bush, and who wrote several memos authorizing torture 
himself, said of Yoo’s arguments about presidential power, “Somebody 
should have exercised some adult leadership” and deleted his arguments 
altogether.  These are the assessments not of human rights advocates or left-
wing critics but of Yoo’s own Republican colleagues at the Justice 
Department.  
The OPR itself, which is comprised of career civil servants charged 
with monitoring ethics violations by Department lawyers and is not known 
for being eager to discipline its own, decided before President Obama took 
office that Yoo and Jay Bybee, Yoo’s superior, had violated their ethical 
duties as attorneys.  After considering responses from Yoo and Bybee, the 
OPR reaffirmed that Yoo had “put his desire to accommodate the client 
above his obligation to provide thorough, objective, and candid legal 
advice, and . . . therefore committed intentional professional misconduct.”6 
It found that Bybee, who signed the 2002 torture memos and is now a judge 
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, had acted in “reckless 
disregard” of the same professional obligation.7  It recommended that both 
lawyers be referred to their respective state bar associations for discipline.8  
This is about as far from vindication as one can imagine. 
So how could Yoo portray this process as a victory?  Only because one 
Justice Department official, Associate Deputy Attorney General David 
Margolis, overruled the OPR’s considered opinion.  Margolis also criticized 
Yoo and Bybee, finding that they exercised “poor judgment,” but he 
concluded that the Justice Department should not refer them for discipline 
because in his view they did not knowingly provide false advice, and 
therefore were not guilty of professional misconduct.  But Margolis’s 
assessment was in no way an endorsement of Yoo’s theories or practices.  
He described the issue of whether Yoo engaged in misconduct as a “close 
question,” called the memos “an unfortunate chapter in the history of the 
Office of Legal Counsel,” and said he feared that “John Yoo’s loyalty to his 
own ideology and convictions clouded his view of his obligation to his 
client and led him to author opinions that reflected his own extreme, albeit 
sincerely held, views of executive power.”9 In short, no one who reviewed 
Yoo’s work gave it a passing grade.  And he narrowly escaped a referral to 
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his bar association for disciplinary action only because of the decision of a 
single lawyer in the Justice Department. 
Serious questions remain.  The OPR was unable to obtain the testimony 
of many high-level officials, including Attorney General John Ashcroft and 
White House lawyers David Addington and Timothy Flanigan, all of whom 
played critical roles in authorizing torture but refused to participate in the 
inquiry.  A full-scale investigation, preferably by an independent 
commission, not part of the very department implicated in the wrongdoing, 
is still necessary, although the chances of such a commission being formed 
seem slim. 
Yet the unanimous condemnation of Yoo’s work by his peers does not 
merely reflect the reality that the August 2002 memo he drafted was, 
ultimately, indefensible.  The chorus of criticism is also highly 
opportunistic.  Yoo’s peers protest too much.  By focusing attention on his 
flaws, they seek to divert attention from their own subsequent approval of 
the same criminal conduct.  In short, Yoo’s peers seek to sacrifice him in 
order to save their own skins.  The OPR itself fell for this stratagem, 
focusing nearly all of its attention on Yoo’s misdeeds and largely 
disregarding the equally disturbing conduct of his successors at the OLC.  
And by focusing on Yoo’s methods, rather than his result, the OLC failed to 
confront the real failing.  It was not only in Yoo’s work, but also in that of 
those who, following him, authorized the CIA to engage in torture and 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 
The OPR and Margolis largely agreed that Yoo’s memos contained 
many serious flaws.  Yoo interpreted the ban on torture to require the 
intentional infliction of severe pain of the level associated with death and 
organ failure, a standard he imported from a health benefits statute having 
no relevance to the issue at hand.  The standard is literally meaningless, as 
neither death nor organ failure is associated with any particular level of 
pain.  Some people die painlessly; others suffer extreme pain.  The same 
holds true for organ failure.  Yoo appears to have adopted this gloss not to 
clarify what is prohibited, but to send the message that only an 
extraordinarily high degree of pain amounts to torture. 
Yoo also wrote that an interrogator could inflict even that level of 
severe pain as long as he did not “specifically intend” to do so.  He advised 
that the President could order outright torture, and that a criminal statute to 
the contrary could not constrain the President as commander in chief.  
(Indeed, he later told the OPR that the president could not even be 
prohibited from ordering the extermination of an entire village of 
civilians.10)  And he reasoned that an interrogator who engages in torture 
could defend his behavior by claiming that it was done because of 
“necessity” or because it was required for self-defense – of the nation, not 
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of the interrogator himself – even where no imminent threat is posed.  Yoo 
employed unprecedented and virtually unrecognizable versions of these 
defenses.  (The OPR report discloses that even the lawyer who worked 
under Yoo on the memos initially found his argument about self-defense 
“wholly implausible,” because self-defense requires an imminent threat to 
the person invoking it, and interrogators faced no such threat.11) 
Where the OPR viewed these errors cumulatively as evidence of an 
extraordinary and ultimately bad-faith effort to contort the law to reach a 
predetermined result, Margolis principally treated the errors one by one, 
and concluded that no single error “of itself” warranted a finding of 
professional misconduct.12  Margolis, in short, missed the forest for the 
trees. 
In a more fundamental sense, however, both the OPR and Margolis 
failed to confront the real wrong at issue.  They focused exclusively on the 
manner by which Yoo and Bybee arrived at their result, rather than the 
result itself.  What is most disturbing about the torture memos is not that 
they employ strained reasoning or fail to cite this or that authority or 
counter-argument, but that they do so in the name of authorizing torture 
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of human beings.  
Remarkably, neither the OPR nor Margolis directly considered the illegality 
of the conduct that was authorized by the memos.  The OPR stated that it 
“did not attempt to determine and did not base our findings on whether . . . 
[the] Memos arrived at a correct result.”13 Margolis also did not address 
whether the conduct authorized was illegal.  But surely that is the central 
issue. 
Why, then, did the OPR and Margolis fail to consider the legality of the 
brutality itself?  Almost certainly because doing so would have implicated 
not only John Yoo and Jay Bybee, but all of the lawyers who approved 
these methods over the five-year course of their implementation, including, 
within the Justice Department, Jack Goldsmith, Daniel Levin, and Steven 
Bradbury, Bybee’s successors as head of the OLC, and two Attorneys 
General, John Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzales.  When one considers that 
they authorized the same illegal conduct, the criticisms offered by OLC 
heads Goldsmith, Levin, and Bradbury seem designed to distance 
themselves from Yoo, even as they concurred with the bottom line of the 
Yoo and Bybee memos that the tactics being used by the CIA were 
legitimate. 
Goldsmith, for example, rescinded only one of Yoo and Bybee’s two 
August 1, 2002, memos – the one that was leaked – and left in place a still-
classified memo that authorized all of the specific procedures employed by 
the CIA. Goldsmith did temporarily suspend authorization of 
waterboarding, but not because it was torture.  He did so, he said, because 
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he believed that the CIA may have used it in ways that diverged from its 
authorized form.14 
Goldsmith and Levin drafted a replacement memo for the original 
torture memo.  But that memo, issued in December 2004 under Levin’s 
signature shortly after Goldsmith’s departure from OLC, pointedly did not 
alter any of the office’s bottom-line conclusions that the CIA’s tactics were 
legitimate.  It used more politic rhetoric (no doubt because it was drafted 
for public release, unlike Yoo’s memo), but it permitted the CIA to 
continue to subject suspects to forced nudity, extended sleep deprivation, 
slaps to the face and stomach, painful and extended stress positions, being 
slammed into walls, and waterboarding – the very tactics Yoo and Bybee 
had approved. 
For his part, Bradbury wrote three memos in 2005 and one in 2007, all 
of which concluded that the CIA could continue to engage in whatever 
coercive tactics it requested.  These memos are in some sense even more 
disingenuous than the initial memos authored by Yoo and Bybee.  Each of 
these memos concluded, in secret, that the CIA did not need to change its 
practices, despite the fact that the law, at least for public consumption, had 
grown increasingly restrictive with respect to interrogation tactics.  Thus, 
when Congress, under Senator John McCain’s leadership and over strong 
objections from President Bush and Vice-President Cheney, made clear that 
it would reject the Bush administration’s view that the ban on cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment did not apply to foreigners held outside 
our borders,15 Bradbury wrote two memos concluding that none of the 
CIA’s tactics were cruel, inhuman, or degrading anyway – even when 
inflicted in combination.  This is a truly remarkable conclusion – namely, 
that the CIA could deprive a suspect of sleep for days on end, repeatedly 
slap him in the stomach and face, force him into painful stress positions for 
hours at a time, and waterboard him, without inflicting cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment.  John Bellinger, who served as legal adviser to the 
National Security Council and the Department of State under President 
Bush, and who himself signed off on the CIA’s torture tactics in 2003, told 
the OPR that this memo’s conclusion was “so contrary to the commonly 
held understanding of the [anti-torture] treaty that he considered that the 
memorandum was ‘written backwards’ to accommodate a desired result.” 
Bradbury reached this conclusion by aggressively misreading 
constitutional precedent.16  He reasoned that the relevant standard under 
U.S. law for what constitutes “cruel, inhuman, or degrading” is whether 
government conduct “shocks the conscience,” a due process test, because 
the Senate had said as much in approving the treaty.  But he then 
 
 14. Id. at 115. 
 15. 42 U.S.C. §2000dd (2006). 
 16. For a more detailed analysis of the torture memos’ strained reasoning, see DAVID 
COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE (2009). 
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concluded – entirely unreasonably – that the CIA tactics would not shock 
the conscience for two reasons.  First, CIA interrogators inflicted pain not 
arbitrarily, but for a good end – to gather intelligence about terrorism.  
Citing Supreme Court language stating that “the official conduct ‘most 
likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level,’ is the ‘conduct intended to 
injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest,’”17 Bradbury 
then treated that standard as if it were the only standard for conscience-
shocking behavior.  Second, he reasoned that the techniques were not 
arbitrary because the government sought to “minimize the risk of injury or 
any suffering that does not further the Government’s interest in obtaining 
actionable intelligence.”18  Significantly, however, the memo did not claim 
that the CIA’s techniques sought to minimize the risk of all injury or 
suffering, but only of injury or suffering “that does not further the 
Government’s interest.” 
The case law is clear, however, that any intentional infliction of pain 
for interrogation purposes violates due process.  And the Court has 
recognized no sliding scale that would permit the infliction of pain if the 
government’s reason is good enough.  Injurious conduct that is 
“unjustifiable by any government interest” is the easiest case, to be sure, but 
the Court has repeatedly found its conscience shocked where the 
government acted with wholly legitimate interests. 
The Court ruled, for example, that pumping a man’s stomach in a 
hospital after seeing him swallow what appeared to be drugs shocked the 
conscience, even though the procedure was carried out in a hospital 
pursuant to safe procedures, and for a wholly legitimate purpose – to gather 
evidence of crime.19  The Court has repeatedly held that any use or threat of 
force to coerce a confession violates due process – even where employed to 
solve a murder.20  And it has stated that government conduct that 
contravenes the "decencies of civilized conduct”21 or that is “so ‘brutal’ and 
‘offensive’ that it [does] not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and 
decency’ would violate due process.”22  All of these decisions point to the 
same conclusion – that the deliberate infliction of pain to compel a suspect 
to talk against his will shocks the conscience 
In Chavez v. Martinez, the Supreme Court, in 2002, addressed whether 
the interrogation of a man while he was hospitalized and suffering 
substantial pain from a police shooting violated the Constitution – even 
 
 17. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (1994) (quoting County of Sacramento v. 
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 18. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN A. 
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 20. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 
U.S. 143 (1944). 
 21. Rochin, supra note 19, at 172-173. 
 22. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957). 
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though the statements were never used in a prosecution.  Significantly, the 
interrogating officers did not inflict any pain for the purpose of questioning, 
although they did continue the interrogation despite the man’s cries of pain.  
The officers maintained that the man’s testimony was critical to 
investigating the encounter, and they feared that he might die, so that this 
may have been their only opportunity to obtain his version of events.  The 
Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to consider whether the 
questioning violated substantive due process.  While the justices disagreed 
about the specific conclusions to be drawn from the facts at hand, both 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who concluded that due process had been 
violated, and Justice Clarence Thomas, who concluded that it had not, 
agreed that the deliberate infliction of pain on an individual to compel him 
to talk would shock the conscience.  Justice Kennedy reasoned that police 
“may not prolong or increase a suspect’s suffering against the suspect’s 
will,” or even give him “the impression that severe pain will be alleviated 
only if [he] cooperates.”23  Under this standard, likely to be the majority 
view given Justice Kennedy’s central role on the Court, any use of pain to 
compel a suspect to talk violates due process.  Justice Thomas found that 
due process had not been violated, but only because he found “no evidence 
that Chavez acted with a purpose to harm Martinez,” or that “Chavez’s 
conduct exacerbated Martinez’s injuries.”24  Under either approach, then, a 
purpose to harm violates due process.  The court of appeals on remand in 
Chavez unanimously held that the alleged conduct indeed shocked the 
conscience, a fact not even acknowledged by the OLC memo.25 
The OLC memo cites Chavez, but concludes, incredibly, that “the CIA 
program is considerably less invasive or extreme than much of the conduct 
at issue in” Chavez.26  In fact, just the opposite is true.  The officers in 
Chavez inflicted no pain for purposes of interrogation – yet three members 
of the Supreme Court found their conduct conscience-shocking nonetheless, 
as did the unanimous court of appeals on remand.  The CIA’s entire 
program, by contrast, was based on the deliberate infliction of pain and 
humiliation to compel recalcitrant suspects to talk against their will. 
When the Supreme Court in 2006 rejected the Bush administration’s 
position that the Geneva Conventions did not protect al Qaeda and Taliban 
detainees,27 Bradbury wrote yet another secret memo in 2007, this time 
concluding that the CIA’s tactics did not violate the Geneva Conventions’ 
 
 23. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
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 24. Id. at 775 (Thomas, J., joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia). 
 25. Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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 27. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006). 
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requirement that all detainees must be treated humanely.28  One can be sure 
that if another nation sought to deploy the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” on U.S. prisoners of war, the United States would consider 
such treatment a blatant violation of the Geneva Conventions’ guarantee of 
“humane treatment.”  Yet the OLC concluded otherwise, driven, it seems, 
more by a desire not to undercut prior authorizations than by a desire to 
arrive at the legal truth. 
Margolis sought to excuse Yoo and Bybee in part on the basis of the 
extraordinary circumstances in which they wrote their initial memos, within 
one year after September 11.  It’s not clear why this consideration should 
excuse approval of torture or cruel or inhuman treatment.  But that excuse is 
not even conceivably available for Yoo and Bybee’s successors in the 
Justice Department.  They wrote their memos not in the heat of the 
moment, but after the program had been in place for years, and had been the 
subject of substantial criticism by the CIA’s own inspector general.  The 
inspector general found, among other things, no evidence that the practices 
in fact obtained useful information that lawful, noncoercive tactics would 
not have obtained.29  Yet OLC lawyers continued to approve of the 
practices. 
Yoo and Bybee are in some sense easy targets.  Their memos were the 
first to be written, and they employed less polished rhetoric and less 
nuanced argument than the memos that followed years later, written by 
authors who had the benefit of hindsight and were aware of the public 
condemnation that the initial memo had occasioned.  But surely what was 
wrong with all the memos, at bottom, was the legal approval of conduct 
that, under any reasonable understanding of the terms, amounted to torture 
or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, all of which the United States 
has solemnly committed to abjure.  That conclusion was apparently too 
dangerous for either Margolis or the OPR, since it would have implicated 
everyone who had approved the CIA interrogation program, not just Yoo 
and Bybee.   
In fairness, responsibility for the illegal brutality inflicted on CIA and 
Guantánamo detainees cannot be restricted to Yoo and Bybee.  It extends to 
all those who approved the tactics – even those, like Goldsmith, Levin, and 
Bradbury, who were so eager to condemn Yoo’s reasoning later.  As we 
recently learned from an admission in former President George W. Bush’s 
memoir, Decision Points, responsibility extends even to the President 
 
 28. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN A. 
RIZZO RE: APPLICATION OF THE WAR CRIMES ACT, THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT, AND 
COMMON ARTICLE 3 OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS TO CERTAIN TECHNIQUES THAT MAY BE 
USED BY THE CIA IN THE INTERROGATION OF HIGH VALUE AL QAEDA DETAINEES (2007). 
 29. See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SPECIAL REVIEW: COUNTERTERRORISM 
DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES 100 (2004). 
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himself.30  And unless we as citizens demand some form of accountability 
for the wrongs done in our name, responsibility extends to all of us as well. 
Margolis concluded his memo with an important caveat: “OPR’s 
findings and my decision are less important than the public’s ability to 
make its own judgments about these documents and to learn lessons for the 
future.”  In this, at least, he was exactly right.  The most important question 
going forward is whether the Bush administration’s decision to authorize 
and practice torture and cruelty will be viewed as a necessary adjustment in 
a time of severe crisis or as a morally, constitutionally, and ethically 
culpable descent into illegality.  The former conclusion would leave these 
tactics lying around “like a loaded gun,” ready to be deployed again in 
some future crisis.  The latter assessment might, by contrast, provide a 
check on such tactics being repeated.  The failure of the OPR and Margolis 
to confront the illegality of the CIA’s approved techniques constitutes a 
fundamental flaw in their approach, but it does not excuse others from 
doing so. 
For his part, President Obama has insisted that we must look forward, 
not back, and has opposed efforts to create a bipartisan commission to 
investigate torture.  His Justice Department has also successfully opposed 
all civil lawsuits seeking compensation for those victimized by torture.  
And the only criminal investigation of torture underway as of September 
2009 focuses solely on the isolated acts of a few CIA interrogators who 
went beyond the brutality authorized by the Justice Department’s OLC and 
Bush’s Cabinet-level officials, but does not encompass those who 
authorized brutality in the first place. 
Without the President’s support, it is hard to see how any official 
mechanism for accountability can proceed.  The President’s supporters 
argue that a commission would be extremely divisive, and would take time 
and attention away from all the other problems that the nation faces.  Even 
more fundamentally, the Democrats seem to be afraid of appearing soft on 
terrorism, of being labeled as caring more about the rights of suspected 
terrorists than about the security of Americans. 
But here, President Obama might look to the example of David 
Cameron, Britain’s new Conservative Prime Minister.  Cameron took office 
in 2010 without garnering a majority vote, and had to forge a political 
alliance with the Liberal Democrats even to assume the post of prime 
minister.  His political position could hardly be more tenuous.  And the 
United Kingdom, in the midst of a severe economic crisis, faces at least as 
many grave problems as does the United States.  Yet shortly after he took 
office, Cameron announced an official public inquiry into allegations of 
high-level British complicity in the torture of terrorism suspects, saying, 
“the longer these questions remain unanswered, the bigger the stain on our 
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reputation as a country that believes in freedom, fairness and human rights 
grows.”31 
Why was Cameron able to do what Obama was not? In some measure, 
it is because Britain has learned from its past.  In early skirmishes with the 
Irish Republican Army in the 1970s, the British responded much as the 
Bush administration did after 9/11.  They interned hundreds of suspects 
without charges, and used torture and brutality to interrogate them –  
including sleep deprivation, shackling and painful stress positions.  The 
tactics backfired.  They created a public relations disaster for the nation and 
gave the IRA its most potent recruiting tool. 
But Britain’s leaders did not insist that they must look forward, not 
back.  Instead, in 1971 Prime Minister Edward Heath appointed a 
commission of inquiry, headed by Lord Parker, the Lord Chief Justice of 
England, to look into the practice.  A year later, the Parker commission 
issued a report finding that the tactics violated domestic law.32  In the 
United Kingdom today, there is widespread public agreement that such 
tactics are never permissible.  In the United States, by contrast, polls 
consistently show division over whether torture may sometimes be justified. 
It was only by looking backward that Britain moved forward.  The 
United States must do the same.  Fears of political division, or of being 
called “soft on terror,” cannot excuse us from acknowledging our legal and 
moral wrongs.  We must continue to insist on accountability, whether in 
congressional hearings, citizens’ commissions, civil lawsuits, or the 
marketplace of ideas.  The essential lesson must be that torture and cruel 
treatment are not policy options, even when a lawyers are willing to write 
“slovenly” 33 opinions blessing illegality. 
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 32. Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors Appointed To Consider Authorised 
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